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New Wine in Old Bottles: 
Certificate of Need Enters the 1990s 
Robert B. Hackey 
University of Massachusetts 
Abstract Although state certificate-of-need (CON) programs have been the subject 
of intense criticism over the past decade, recent evidence suggests that CON pro- 
grams may be more effective than commonly believed. While many state programs 
have yielded disappointing results, the CON process can also be used to achieve 
other important policy objectives, such as increasing access to care for the uninsured 
and increasing lay participation in health policy planning. In sum, rather than fading 
away after the termination of federal support for health planning in 1986, state CON 
programs are poised to assume new roles during the 1990s. 
After a decade in which regulatory solutions to rising health care costs, 
and certificate-of-need (CON) regulation in particular, fell out of favor 
among academics, policymakers , and health providers, health planning 
and capital expenditure controls have resurfaced on the health policy 
agenda in the 1990s. Two articles in this issue of the Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law take a look at these trends. In their study, Charles 
and DeMaio offer a fresh look at citizen participation-once an integral 
part of CON regulation in the U. S . , but now a largely overlooked topic- 
while Campbell and Fournier discuss the impact of CON on the provi- 
sion of indigent hospital care. Together, they provide an opportunity to 
reexamine the future prospects of health planning and certificate-of-need 
regulation in the United States. In the eyes of their critics, CON programs 
have failed to control costs, stifled competition (Burda 1991), and had 
little impact on access to health care for either the poor or geographically 
underserved regions (Sloan 1988). Indeed, according to Bovbjerg ( 1988: 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 1993. Copyright 0 1993 by 
Duke University. 
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206), “the evidence that CON in practice has accomplished any useful 
social objectives is very weak.” 
Current perceptions of CON’S failure as a cost control strategy, how- 
ever, are largely based on assessments of program performance during the 
1970s; more recent evidence suggests that the performance of many CON 
programs has improved over time. Furthermore, despite their emphasis on 
controlling costs, CON programs have always had multiple goals. Camp- 
bell and Fournier’s discussion of Florida’s CON program, coupled with 
experience from other states, suggests that CON programs may serve an 
important role in increasing access to health care. Finally, the growing 
influence of the “outcomes movement” (Epstein 1990) on both payers 
and providers in recent years points to a new role for state CON programs 
in the 1990s, for recent studies of the appropriate utilization of health 
care services offer improved guidance for regulators in determining the 
“need” for new health care facilities. 
The Limitations of CON as a Cost Control Strategy 
Widespread dissatisfaction with the cost control record of state CON pro- 
grams produced a large range of responses among the states after the ex- 
piration of Pub. L. No. 93-641: twelve states abandoned CON altogether, 
while some raised the threshold for CON review and others strengthened 
their programs. No state, however, has abolished CON since 1989 (Burda 
1991), and at least one state (New Jersey) has taken steps to recreate local 
planning agencies to review capital projects (Brandon 1992). 
On the surface, Campbell and Fournier’s claim that “protecting profits 
is the core of what CON regulation is all about” is consistent with studies 
of entry regulation in other industries where business groups either sup- 
ported regulation as a means to avert destructive competition or “cap- 
tured” government regulatory agencies (Stigler 1971; Lowi 1969). Upon 
closer inspection, however, the authors’ contention that states adopted 
CON programs for reasons besides controlling costs is not persuasive. 
Although hospitals often supported CON review as a less onerous process 
than prospective rate-setting programs, several states that pioneered CON 
legislation prior to the passage of federal health planning legislation in 
1974 were also early leaders in hospital rate regulation (e.g. Massachu- 
setts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island). Confronted by rapidly 
escalating Medicaid costs, state governments seized upon CON as an im- 
perfect but easily implemented tool to control the explosion of hospital 
capital expenditures and state Medicaid budgets in the late 1960s. Rather 
Hackey NewWine 929 
than accommodating providers’ interests, both CON and hospital rate set- 
ting programs are examples of what Brown (1982) labels “rationalizing 
politics,” as state governments sought new ways to cope with the fiscal 
consequences of expanding entitlement programs and endemic inflation 
in the health sector. 
Early assessments of program performance generally concluded that 
CON had little impact on overall hospital cost inflation, but more recent 
evidence suggests that the performance of many programs improved over 
time, particularly in states with a strong commitment to controlling costs 
(Donahue et al. 1992; Morone 1990; Scott et al. 1987).’ In part, the per- 
ceived failure of CON is the result of unrealistic expectations. Federal 
health planning initiatives under Pub. L. No. 93-641 placed too much reli- 
ance on indirect approaches to controlling costs (e.g., capital expenditure 
controls), reflecting Morone’s (1990: 272) observation that “when the in- 
coherent American state faces vexing problems, it reflexively musters up 
[the] hope of rationalization without fundamental change .” Since CON 
programs must cope with multiple, often conflicting goals (Brown 1983) 
and intense opposition from both providers and local communities, the 
inability of state regulators to reduce system-wide hospital expenditures 
(Sloan 1988) is not surprising. However, the experiences of several states 
that implemented capital expenditure caps over the past decade suggests 
that CON’S limitations as a cost control strategy is related to “the lack of 
competition for a limited pool of resources” (Young 1991: 272). Under an 
open-ended CON review process, an unlimited number of projects could 
be approved if applicants could demonstrate that the proposed services 
were “needed.” A ceiling on capital expenditures, however, forces deci- 
sion makers to prioritize programs and choose those projects which are 
most beneficial (Young 1991; Donahue et al. 1992). Since the merits of 
each institution’s application are judged relative to others, the implemen- 
tation of a capital cap creates a zero-sum game for providers, in which 
the approval of one project automatically reduces the funds available for 
others. 
Even in the absence of a capital cap, however, a singular focus on 
the rate of project denials or the savings in capital and operating costs 
associated with rejected CON applications understates the impact of capi- 
tal expenditure controls on providers’ behavior. Since the deliberations 
that accompany the CON review process often lead to concessions by 
1 .  See Sloan 1988 for an excellent review of evaluations of state CON programs’ performance 
during the 1970s. 
930 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 
providers, modifications of proposed projects offer a viable alternative 
to achieving regulators’ desired objectives (e.g. , expanding care for the 
uninsured , lowering operating costs by requiring a higher equity contribu- 
tion by applicants). Furthermore, as Tierney et al. (1982) argue, effective 
communication between state regulatory agencies and providers should 
minimize the number of denials. The existence of CON may also deter 
providers from submitting weak proposals for review, for “few institu- 
tions are likely to expend the time, energy, and money to traverse the 
complex certificate of need process for a project that cannot withstand the 
test of public scrutiny” (Tierney et al. 1982: 178). 
CON and the Uninsured 
By the mid-1980s, the health policy agenda had changed: while con- 
trolling costs remained the central goal of both state and federal policy- 
makers, the growing number of persons without health insurance and 
hospitals’ mounting fiscal losses from uncompensated care brought con- 
cerns about access to health care back to the health policy agenda. While 
other states developed uncompensated care pools or all-payer rate-setting 
programs or flirted with universal health insurance , Florida’s legislature 
favored implicit rather than explicit solutions to the state’s growing in- 
digent care problem (Jones 1989). In Florida, the ability of hospitals to 
fund indigent care through cost shifting was limited by extensive pene- 
tration by HMOs into the market, an above-average number of for-profit 
hospitals, and Medicare’s status as the largest third-party payer in the 
state. As a result, Campbell and Fournier argue that “hospital regulators 
had a conscious policy of protecting the interests of hospitals that provide 
large amounts of indigent care” during the 1980s. Although Campbell and 
Fournier claim that regulators’ emphasis on the provision of indigent care 
limited competition in the state’s hospital industry, the practice reflects 
the desire of state officials to preserve access to care for the uninsured 
using the institutional resources at their disposal. 
Two issues, however, limit the authors’ ability to generalize their find- 
ing to the CON programs of other states. First, since Florida’s threshold 
for CON review ($1 million for capital costs, $500,000 for operating 
costs) is higher than many other states, projects subject to review in other 
states may be excluded from the analysis. Second, the authors’ empirical 
analysis does not control for the effect on the CON process of a hospital’s 
teaching status or the institution’s status as a sole community provider; 
teaching hospitals, in particular, typically offer a wider range of services 
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and have different capital requirements than smaller community hospi- 
tals. Since a number of studies have documented that teaching hospitals 
provide a disproportionate amount of uncompensated care, the authors’ 
observation that CON approvals are “a reward to hospitals providing large 
amounts of indigent care” may reflect a bias toward teaching institu- 
tions afliliated with university medical schools rather than discrimination 
against hospitals with a poor record of providing care for the indigent (see 
Sloan 1988). 
In the absence of other institutional levers, CON offered officials in 
Florida both a carrot and a stick to modify providers’ behavior. While 
Campbell and Fournier lament the fact that regulators possessed “un- 
precedented power to pursue objectives other than cost control ,” Florida’s 
CON legislation (and that of other states) offers multiple criteria for 
policymakers to use in making decisions. Indeed, as the authors note, 
the criteria for project review described in the rules and regulations gov- 
erning the CON process “enumerate roughly a dozen aims that are un- 
weighted and potentially conflicting.” Confronted by a growing indigent 
care problem and restrictive Medicaid eligibility requirements, public offi- 
cials in Florida used their regulatory mandate to encourage hospitals to 
provide care for the uninsured. 
Outcomes Assessment and CON 
A renewed emphasis on the assessment of patient outcomes also points 
to new roles for state CON programs over the next decade, for, as Rel- 
man (1988: 1221) notes, “the chief cause of the cost crisis [in American 
medicine] is not so much the price as the ever-increasing volume and 
intensity of medical services being provided in outpatient settings and 
hospitals.” As the cost of health care continued to climb, business groups 
and third-party payers have increasingly sought to link reimbursement to 
patient outcomes. Businesses’ interest in “buying right” was also sparked 
by the appearance of studies that documented considerable geographic 
2. The authors’ claim that the principal purpose of CON was to avoid unnecessary duplica- 
tion of services and to control costs is inconsistent with their earlier observation that Florida’s 
CON statute did not prioritize among criteria for project review. In addition, several other states 
have incorporated the level of uncompensated care into the CON process for both profit and 
nonprofit hospitals (see Sloan 1988). 
3. For example, the number of persons undergoing coronary angioplasty in the U.S. grew 
almost tenfold over the past decade, from fewer than 30,000 nationwide in 1983 to more than 
285,000 in 1990, while the number of coronary artery bypass grafts more than doubled in the 
same period (see Grayboys et al. 1992). 
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and racial differences in the use of health care services, without come- 
sponding differences in patient outcomes. In particular, recent studies 
of several surgical procedures (e.g . , cardiac catheterization, carotid end- 
arterectomy, coronary angiography) by Chassin et al. (1987), Grayboys 
et al. (1992), and others found that many surgical procedures were either 
“inappropriate” or of “uncertain” clinical value. Such studies, and the 
public’s interest in them, are likely to accelerate in the future, as states 
follow the lead of Pennsylvania’s Health Care Cost Containment Council, 
which has published outcomes data from each of the state’s acute care 
hospitals since 1989.4 Oregon recently passed legislation to link the ap- 
proval of new capital projects to an institution’s patient outcomes. Under 
the new criteria, an institution must demonstrate sufficient patient volume 
for proposed services, so that “if a new transplant center is proposed, or 
if a medical facility wants to buy magnetic resonance imaging equipment, 
questions will be asked about whether the patient base will support it, and 
whether its purchase will affect patient outcomes” (Alter and Holtzman 
1992: 20). 
Oregon’s example points the way toward a new role for state CON 
programs in what Relman (1988: 1220) dubs the “third revolution in 
medical care.” While health planners’ initial definition of the “need” 
for new facilities was both vague and imprecise, the growing literature 
on the appropriate utilization of health services offers concrete clinical 
standards to regulators, with which they can evaluate applications. Using 
recent studies as a benchmark, state regulators are already beginning to 
apply the guidelines developed by outcomes researchers in evaluating 
CON applications based on the appropriate utilization of existing ser- 
vices. Recent studies show that the utilization of cardiac catheterizations, 
coronary angioplasties, and other specialized diagnostic and therapeutic 
procedures in recent years is driven, at least in part, by the process of 
reimbursement, because payer status (whether the patients have private 
insurance or Medicaid or will themselves pay) is strongly associated with 
patients’ use of health services (Wenneker et al. 1990). Wennberg (1987) 
notes that the steady growth in the number of specialists trained in inva- 
sive technologies has contributed to continued inflation in the per capita 
cost of health care. The CON process may be used to identify potentially 
4. The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) re- 
cently decided to incorporate patient outcome measures and other quality-of-care indicators into 
its accreditation criteria over the next decade. In addition, New York’s Commissioner of Health, 
Mark Chassin, recently proposed linking hospital reimbursement to quality-of-care measures in 
the 1993 renegotiation of the state’s prospective hospital reimbursement system (Darby 1993: 1 ) .  
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unnecessary and expensive facilities and discourage the overutilization of 
specialized procedures when there is evidence that the proposed services 
have no significant impact on patient outcomes. 
CON and Public Accountability 
Despite its limitations in controlling systemwide costs, CON review re- 
mains one of the few institutional forums for public participation in health 
policy decision making. As Charles and DeMaio note, citizen participa- 
tion in planning and allocating health services and facilities provides an 
institutional arrangement to “increase public accountability for decisions 
on the allocation of health care resources, in order to make providers more 
accountable to the communities that they serve.” While citizens’ ability 
to influence policy choices are limited by the imbalance of resources be- 
tween health providers and lay participants (Morone and Marmor 1981), 
the CON process offers payers, legislators, and other nonproviders a 
“foot in the door” to assess the need for new facilities and services. In 
this respect, regardless of the limitations of capital expenditure review 
for controlling health care costs, state CON programs have an important 
role as a public forum to provide public input into health care policy- 
making. Since decisions affecting the price and availability of health care 
services emerge as the byproduct of a quasi corporatist bargaining pro- 
cess (Hackey 1992; Bergthold 1988), in the absence of other institutional 
arrangements, the CON process allows for public comment on proposed 
health care resource allocation decisions at meetings which are open to 
the public. 
Conclusion 
Two decades after they first appeared on a wide scale, state CON pro- 
grams are poised to assume new roles in the 1990s. Relieved of their 
unrealistic role as the principal means of controlling health care costs, 
CON programs have found new niches since the expiration of federal 
health-planning legislation in 1986. In particular, the proliferation of new 
medical technologies provides a constant reminder that in the absence 
of regulatory controls, new diagnostic and therapeutic services will con- 
tinue to provide health providers with an incentive to boost revenues by 
increasing the volume of specialized services. While a number of states 
imposed moratoria on the construction of new health care facilities after 
1987 (Young 1991), such an approach is a blunt tool for controlling the 
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diffusion of new technologies, since it does not discriminate between 
projects with proven clinical benefits and less essential proposals. In con- 
trast, while CON programs have been criticized for discouraging inno- 
vation, reforms to the review process in Rhode Island and other states 
demonstrate that it is possible for state regulators to assume a proactive 
role in capital expenditure reviews by issuing requests for proposals for 
identified areas of need. Despite its limitations, CON remains one of the 
few tools policymakers have at their disposal to evaluate the need for new 
facilities, using objective criteria, and to encourage the regionalization of 
health care services. 
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